Week 5, Agency & Structure, and Waltz & Neorealist Theory

This week we look at agency vs. structure and how it relates to the idea of change in the international realm. The 2x2 matrix as discussed in the video lecture helps to break down the different “societies of change.” This leads to different theories of whether the international actors actually have the agency to cause change or if change is limited because of structures that are in place.

At the end of the lecture, the professor also asks an interesting question, “ Is global integration favorable?” I’m not sure that it would be possible for complete integration and collaboration between nations as that would most definitely include giving up sovereignty. And I think that the benefit of diversity and culture is more valuable than complete integration of nations. However, even if there was global integration, there is still a possibility of war with domestic wars.  

With this is mind, the article of The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory by Waltz was very interesting in discussing previous wars. Waltz discusses how the neorealist theory looks at war as an effect of the structure of the international realm. Also how the state of war can be defined as a “security dilemma” as nations are in a power struggle that consists of them wanting more power and at the same time seeking to protect themselves and ensure safety (p. 619, Waltz.) And also, giving example of recurring wars, as proof that it is structures that lead to war. I would be interested to see how wars we are fighting now that relate to terrorism would fit in this theory.

Can war be an abstract battle ground for agency? (Week 5)

At this point in my critical thinking, I unfortunately think that war is a recurring international phenomenon. However, this perspective comes with a need to classify what actors are most affected by such a phenomenon as I do not think it universally applies to all actors equally. I don't have an answer or method to determine these various levels, but I could make a few guesses:

• It is likely that the most powerful or influential countries of international relations and foreign policy are most affected by war because they are the most frequent actors on the international stage. Ex. the P5+1: US, Russia, China, UK, France and Germany. 
• It is likely that those with little engagement with foreign actors are the least affected by war because they have little interest it is outcomes. Ex. Australia, New Zealand.
• It is likely that those countries whose borders or governance are controversial are frequently affected by war. Ex. states of the former Soviet Union, ethic division within the Rwandan genocide. 
• It is likely that those countries whose borders are well established and respected by neighbors are not often affected by war. Ex. European Union

However, maybe war doesn't necessarily have to be violent. Instead of armed with guns we can be armed with different ideas and interests that are solved by an abundance of agency and outcomes?  

Professor Jackson concludes his lecture with the massive question: Is global integration desirable? I think this is an absolutely easy question to answer and my answer is YES. As an integrated global society with a common purpose we would actually have the ability to pursue the idea that all men are equal. The US bases its laws on this principal but in reality, the US thinks that Americans are more important than other countries' citizens. A system of global governance would - ideally - act to improve the lives of all the humans on this planet. Sure, a system dictated by sovereign territory might preserve a certain type of diversity, but I don't think that erasing our boundaries would devoid our world of diversity. With over 7 billion people on this planet we are inevitably going to hold onto different identities based on our geography, family culture and inspirations for the future. I personally married a Brazilian man and our children will be dual citizens. Of course this doesn't mean my children will be less diverse but rather that they will be more diverse. Their abilities to understand multiple lifestyles (Minnesotans and people from Rio de Janeiro will always have different lifestyles) will give them more agency. More agency means more options and choices which leads to more outcomes. In my opinion, more outcomes means more diversity. 

Change --- What Is It Good For?

I enjoyed this week's soliloquy, and can see how there is an important social theoretical question surrounding Agency vs Structure. That said, as a practical matter, using war as the case study seemed to make the case that Agency in international relations might be quite limited.  I say that because the case was made fairly convincingly (at least to me) that because fundamental change has not occurred to war over the thousands of years of recorded history, the level of agency must be quite low. Therefore, war, possibly the most basic form of interaction between countries and indeed the reason many states formed (to defend their societies from a war), is structural. So then, if this most basic interaction is structural, how much of international relations is subject to a high level of agency?

Going into the 2x2 matrix, I loved how it was pointed out that just because there is autonomy, there is not necessarily agency because of the possible constraints put on that autonomy. I tend to fall into the upper right quadrant (surprise, surprise), where change may occur, but only as interests rationally adjust to reality. I appreciate the argument that if sovereign states are the organizing units of international relations then change is all but impossible; however we do see in some cases (E.U. former 13 British colonies) where sovereign states see their interests are rationally aligned and allow for change in their sovereignty.

Being a big fan of science fiction, I have a little more of an understanding of terms / ways of thinking about a post sovereign state-world. However my time studying international relations has taught me that absent an existential threat humans are unwilling to change the way they do things. So it would take a clear threat with the potential to wipe out humanity in order to get to a point where we would be willing to set aside our 'us vs them' mentality towards each other, and direct it elsewhere.

Week 4 - Permeability & Autonomy

I enjoyed this past week’s class work of relating each square of the 2x2 with their impact on international relations as it helped bring more clarity. When thinking of the bottom left corner, which is the intersection of permeability and autonomy, my group discussed several examples of how this could relate to international relations.

During this discussion, we mentioned how a nation’s identity in the community greatly influences their decisions (permeable boundaries), even though they ultimately have the autonomy to make their own decisions (autonomy). The idea is that these decisions are made based on what is best for the community, and asking the question, “What is expected of me in this community?”

One example of a group that would fall in this category is NGOs.  They strive to make the decisions that would bring about the best outcome for the community as a whole, whether that be reforms, peace, stability, or another other kind of desired outcome. In light of the conflict we have in the world today, their ability to maneuver in between different nations is an important role in international relations. We see now and in the past that NGOs are able to move into war-torn areas or high conflict zones of the world where similar actions by nations would be perceived as a bigger threat.  Their permeable border and autonomy allows for great success in working with varying international actors that may be at odds. I thought that NGOs were a helpful example of understanding this square in light of international relations. 

How the convergence of social and international theory illustrate our divergence from a common purpose and integration (week 4)

Before today's lecture, I honestly did not understand the difference between the two 2x2 matrices that Professor Jackson had presented in class.  Our discussion during the session revealed the difference between the matrix for social theory and the matrix for international theory.

This in of itself is not that interesting of a revelation. However, when you reflect deeper and realize that the main columns and rows of each matrix are the same, it forces you to explore the relationship between social and international theories. I would think that the same perspectives used to examine the similarities and differences between these two types of theories could also be applied to the relationships between individuals and states. i.e. one might be easier to predict in a certain situation.

It was also interesting to think of social movement as an example of integration or a common purpose. Current events often brings the 'black lives matter' social movement into our spotlight. Such a democratic and basic plea for human rights can be seen all across our world today yet its very existence illustrates both how far we've come and how far we have yet to go. The matrices we study in class seem to present this cell as an unattainable ideal. However, such social movements often seem to also illustrate the divergence from those same ideals.

Week 4 Post-Class Post

I really enjoyed the group discussion during this week’s class. It definitely helped me to better understand the 2x2. I also liked that the groups presented examples from the “real world”.

During the groups presentations a little discussion about the EU came up and I would like to explain my point of view a little better. I can only somewhat agree to the idea that because of Brexit there will be better chances in the EU to come to agreements, especially when it comes to economic issues. The reason why I can only somewhat agree is because of the rise in anti-EU sentiment. In several EU member states anti-EU parties are gaining momentum, including Germany, France, the Netherlands and Austria. Germany’s AfD party has gained enough seats in some state elections, and is now in their Landtags. In Germany, the AfD started gaining momentum during the financial crisis, especially during the Greece crisis. They actually called themselves the Anti-Euro party. Of course, now the party wins more and more voters because of the refugee crisis.

In Germany elections will be held next year. If the AfD gains enough votes (and at the moment it looks like it will), it will make it into the Bundestag. This will make it hard for the new Chancellor (whoever it will be) and her/his party to make pro-EU/pro-Euro decisions. This in turn will influence Germany’s decisions in the EU. Germany is only one example, of course, but the Netherlands, Austria, France etc. will face the same problems. This will make it a lot harder for the EU to come to agreements, including economic decisions.

Brexit was really a bad decision and will have consequences for the EU. Brexit increases the chances that another country might follow England and decide to leave the EU.

Week 4 Post Class

Between this week's class and the assignment due, I feel like the concept of ideas and the application of them to international theory have solidified in my head quite a bit. I enjoyed the in class work on the 2x2 matrix and am not ashamed to say I was relieved to be in the upper right quadrant with interests and rational institutions as those are very intuitive for me.

I greatly enjoy the works of George Friedman (author of The Next 100 Years), and it is through his works that I came to understand national interests and the role those play in international relations. Friedman discusses across multiple books and through his company, Stratfor, how countries have geopolitical imperatives (which roughly correspond to interests). It is those imperatives which govern all that countries do, and make predicting the future over the span of years or decades easier than predicting short term events. Friedman tends to discount the long term impact of ideas on the geopolitical world, and while I don't fully agree with him, I think that when countries follow their hearts (ideas) it ends up getting them in more trouble than they would have otherwise if they had followed their heads (interests). My case and point with this is Germany invading Russia in 1941 (if you want more you will have to listen to my presentation on that :) ).

Chrisman Week 3 Post Class Blog

First off - the way we went through and had all of us talk through how we defined 'ideas' was great. I know that between the start of class and my turn to talk my definition evolved and I think became more useful. Forcing us to conceptualize what was a fairly ethereal concept was very useful and I can only imagine it will pay off more as we go.

The discussion in class definitely helped with my understanding of the role of ideas. This was mainly by increasing my appreciation of Laffey and Weldes and their framing of ideas.  Their critique about how earlier authors may have proposed new ways of looking at ideas, but their frames weren't testable, and so ultimately not as useful as they could have been. Looking at ideas as technologies helps me greatly, as a member of the tech native generation, because I instinctively understand the development and implementation of technology.

Highlighting Goldstein and Keohane's division of ideas and interests as being immaterial and material (respectively) was extremely helpful for me to understand how to look at these two. I look forward to talking more about interests next week.

Ideas vs. Interest + Pope - Week 3 Part 2

The class discussion of Ideas vs. Interests was very helpful. I enjoyed listening to everyone’s definition of “ideas” and appreciate the different yet similar, as it reflects the differences seen in the readings.  I thought it was helpful in looking at “interests” as material and “ideas” as non-material.

Goldstein and Keohane focus on separating interests and ideas, focusing on ideas and how they are the framework from which guides international discussion and policy. They mention that changes in principled views and world views have a huge impact on political action and yet at the same time they are less likely to be changed.

In light of this discussion, I remembered a recent article about Pope Francis and an ongoing disagreement he’s had with Turkey. Beginning last year and again this year, the Pope “has urged the world to never forget the Ottoman-era slaughter of some 1.5 million Armenians [Christians] which he termed a genocide” (Kennedy, M). By making this statement publicly, the Pope angered the Turks who disagree with the Pope’s view of a historical event. Although we see disagreement of how to define this political event, it is possible to see the differing world views when it comes in religion setting a foundation or framework for this disagreement. Looking at the event through a religious lens definitely impacts how it could be viewed and what a nation may pursue or be willing to concede.  In light of the Pope’s comments, the Turkish president removed his ambassador from the Vatican, thus causing further tension.

So relating this to Goldstein and Keohane, I find it very difficult to disagree with them in this situation where ideas as beliefs provide a basis for elements such as religion and human rights violations take center stage in this political relations dispute.

Kennedy, M. (2016). Pope Francis Urges World To Never Forget Armenian Genocide  Retrieved from http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/06/25/483507441/pope-francis-urges-world-to-never-forget-armenian-genocide

Reflections on the Levels of Ideas & Interests (Week 3.2)

We spent all week reading different theories about how ideas and interests are defined, intertwined and dramatized. I thought I had a good handle on how I considered the two to interact but then the Professor's question at the beginning of class stumped me and I was further bewildered as to why I was stumped by such an obvious question: What is the role of ideas in International Relations?

Individuals and groups can describe ideas how they wish, but what really makes a difference in our course (and hopefully future jobs) is how ideas can affect international relations. I don't think we have necessarily discussed how they can affect relations other than exposing ourselves to the right vocabulary to use when discussing ideas and acknowledging that there are conflicting views on how to define both ideas and interests.

For example, the 2x2 matrices in the lectures was fascinating and revealed a lot to me regarding how action is driven on the international/world stage. However, I have to think that following the stereotypes and generalizations of those cells can lead to different actions for individuals vs. democratic governments vs. monarchs vs. dictatorships, etc. Therefore, I think there must be some different levels of these matrices and some drastic differences as to how they are played out.

For example, the professor mentioned that it might be easier for an outsider to guess the actions of a state rather than an individual. This can be illustrated by our current refugee crisis and past immigrant issues. The United States is a country of immigrants and we all play a part in its 'melting pot' or 'salad bowl' mentalities. I like to think that the majority of us welcome diversity - our individuals have a permeable (soft) border and attunement as we pursue a common purpose of freedom and peace. However, at a national level it is different. It is very hard to enter our country uninvited and without proper documentation. Even if a person enters undocumented, their life will be wrought with difficulties. In addition, we don't allow any other countries to tell us what to do or how to do it as our preferences are often presented with the utmost stubbornness and autonomy.

Circling back to my original struggle with answering the question at the beginning of class this week - I think that the role of ideas in international relations depends on the actors.

Interest vs. Ideas Post-Class Blog

This week’s class helped me to understand the concept of ideas vs. interests a lot better. Especially the Goldstein and Keohane text is a lot clearer for me now. However, I am still struggling with Laffey and Weldes’ concept of symbolic technologies. The example offered by Kyra was a very good one, however, I am having issues transferring this example to international relations, especially to international events for this week’s assignment. I hope that I can complete the assignment without problems.

After class I did, however, better understand what Laffey and Weldes say about ideas and interests in foreign policy, and what the main differences are between Laffey and Weldes and Goldstein and Keohane, and why Laffey and Weldes criticize Goldstein and Kehoane’s analysis. Goldstein and Keohane see ideas and interests as two competing things, while Laffey and Weldes believe that ideas structure interests. For Laffey and Weldes ideas exist before interests and therefore ideas influence interests in foreign policy.

I think that the Iraq-Iran War would be a good example where ideas structure interests. Iraq and Iran’s conflict was fueled by Sunni-vs. -Shia and Arab-vs. -Persian disputes on the one hand and border disputes on the other. The religious and ethnic disputes as well as the border disputes influenced Iraq’s decision to gain access to the Persian Gulf by invading Iran and claiming the Khouzestan region, which was inhabited by Arabs, as their territory (Globalsecurity.org). On top of that, claiming this region as their territory also gave Iraq access to the Persian Gulf. So, if I understand this correctly, the religious and ethnic issues structured the Iraqi interests in the Khouzestan region of Iran, which eventually led Saddam Hussein to decide to invade Iran.

References

Globalsecurity. Iran-Iraq War (1980-1988). Accessed September 22, 2016. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/iran-iraq.htm

Week 3 Post Class Blog- Van Deren

As expected, class yesterday was incredibly helpful in my understanding of interests and ideas and the different perspectives of the authors.

One of the most helpful analogies for me was that Goldstein and Keohane see ideas and interests as two different independent variables. Interests are material and ideas are non-material, and while they work together in policy making, they are fundamentally independent from each other. Their neat descriptions of the causal pathways whereby ideas impact foreign policy are also helpful guides. Ideas as road maps, helping “individuals to determine their own preferences” (p. 12). Ideas also help create coalitions across groups. And ideas as constraints when they are institutionalized in government bodies and norms. Before the class discussion, I had not seen how each of these causal pathways for ideas could serve as constraints. It was incredibly helpful for me to consider ideas this way and to help me see the challenges that arise in innovation in foreign policy.

I had read the concept of ideas as symbolic technologies in the Laffey and Weldes reading, but came away from class with a better understanding of what this means. The idea of a conceptual mask, which we put on to help us understand ourselves and others understand us in the world was a great help to me. I think I’ll explore this more in our project that’s due this weekend, but one of the examples of ideas as symbolic technologies that drive foreign policy is the number of ideas that surround the American-Israeli relationship. Israel as a bastion of human rights in a messy Middle East; Israel as a natural partner for the US; Israel as God’s plan for the world; Israel as a reliable ally who will support the US; Israel as the only democracy in the US; all of these ideas function as symbolic technologies through which the US sees relations with Israel, constraining options amidst tense relations with this long term ally. These ideas in part explain the recent American deal to give even higher levels of military aid to Israel amidst increasing tensions between these two longtime allies.

This conversation of ideas has helped me find new ways to wrestle with the rationalist conception of international relations. The concept that actors act purely on their interests, with no preexisting ideas, would mean that states will act in predictable ways according to self-interest and material resources. And yet, we know that this is not the case. The concept of ideas can help explain why states act in different ways according to their set of ideas, coalitions built around ideas, and who they want to present themselves as on the world stage. No foreign policy can be explained solely by the material interests of a state and the presence of anarchy, the addition of ideas into these causal factors provides a deeper and more robust framework to analyze foreign policy. 

Ideas vs. Interest

The idea of Interests vs. Ideas is not an easy concept to try to understand, and like everyone else, I am looking forward to the group discussion tomorrow night.  These readings and their authors offer competing views between whether interests or ideas hold more weight when international policy is concerned however it was difficult for me to really understand how they are intertwined.. I think these competing views are proof that both interests and ideas are involved with international policy, though I don’t have an opinion on which I think is the most influential.

Goldstein and Keohane have a structure for their argument for ideas which is focused on “three types of beliefs: world views,  principled beliefs, and causal beliefs” (p. 8, Goldstein and Keohane.) They focus on how ideas are beliefs and therefore help with navigating and determining the path that a certain policy will take.  This is definitely an interesting argument as it includes religion under the umbrella of “world views” that could be the basis of policy. As we see in history, religion has been at the center of many conflicts between sovereign states.  

Laffey and Weldes bring a critique to the view of “ideas as beliefs." There is a look at the causal relationship between beliefs and ideas and whether or not they can even be defined as the same one as the other (p. 206 Laffey and Weldes.) This is interesting as Goldstein and Keohane argue for causal beliefs as part of their structure.

Again, I’m looking for to the discussion to bring about more clarity. Would definitely be interesting in looking more in the role of world religions and their role in different international policies and relationships.

I sure hope no-one reads this after class

I definitely empathize with Erica as to the concern about navigating and responding to our readings this week. I am glad I watched the soliloquy first as it helped provide a valuable framework by which to read these three pieces; but ultimately feel as though I am only scratching the surface. I began with Weber, moving on to Goldstein and Keohane, went back to Weber and finally ending with Laffey and Weldes (before going back to Weber again since I felt like I had missed something), so that may inform you as to how I arrived at some of my musings.

As I understood the Weber remarks, ideas may have played a role in the emergence of what we see in the world, but it was the combination of ideas and the ability/willingness of society to use those ideas which allowed the West to take ideas which had existed around the world for millennia and operationalize them. I understood Weber to be pushing back against the idea that capitalism was the reason for that success as capitalism was elsewhere in times before the West emerged triumphant. Amazingly enough this was (I think) the first time I have read Max Weber and found his take on capitalism to be refreshing, especially because of the environment (roaring 20s) that he was writing in.

Taking that and moving into Goldstein and Keohane I saw how their argument about ideas have to potential to inform/shape policy when they are in a usable form (provide clarity, affect outcomes or are part of political institutions) (Goldstein & Keohane, 1993). What I suppose I didn't get from Weber the first time around (hence returning to it several times) what how he said ideas AND interests were what drove the world. It wasn't until I realized that it was exactly those interests which were the 'ability/willingness of society' that I had seen initially. Having taken Quantitative Methods, Forecasting and International Negotiations I was excited to see Pareto improvements mentioned, although I am not ashamed to admit after my initial excitement about remembering that I knew that term, I realized I didn't remember what it actually meant so that necessitated a quick detour to Google.

By the time I made it to Laffey and Weldes I was well and thoroughly convinced about the utility of ideas and how their use moved empires, so the opening paragraph about how ideas are over-hyped got me excited that there was about to be a literary fight (this sense was heightened by the quote from Goldstein and Keohane on page 2). The conceptualization of ideas as symbolic technologies is a very useful way of understanding the social nature of 'ideas' and how they are used by societies (for good or ill) (Laffey & Weldes, 1997). This conceptualization and subsequent operationalization gave me a clear idea of how these new social goods could be understood, developed and spread.

Week 3 Readings

This week’s readings were really tough for me. I especially had a hard time with the text by Mark Laffey and Jutta Weldes. Laffey and Weldes write that ideas affect foreign policy even when actors conducting themselves rationally (1997, p. 193-194). They criticize rationalists who believe that policy actions are affected by “changes in factors other than ideas” (Laffey and Weldes 1997, p. 197). However, even when actors behave rationally, ideas still play a role in policy making.

Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane’s text was a little easier for me. Goldstein and Keohane also write that that ideas play an important role in foreign policy. However, they use ideas and beliefs interchangeably. Goldstein and Keohane define ideas “as beliefs held by individuals” (1993, p. 3).  Laffey and Weldes criticize Goldstein and Keohane because they think that beliefs are not held by individuals but rather are shared. The shared beliefs by people have an impact on why certain foreign policy decisions are made or why states act they way they do (Laffey and Weldes 1993, p. 198). In this week’s lecture we learn that ideas are norms and values, and that ideas are created in our cultural environment. Ideas, therefore, are not just beliefs held by individuals but are shared by many in a society.

In Max Weber’s Prefatory Remarks, Weber does not talk about ideas and interests per se, but rather the role of rationalization in politics, society and the economy in the West. For example, he points out that modern capitalism only exists in the West because of rational organization of companies (1920, p. 155). After watching the lecture, I would say that the rationalization Weber talks about are the interests that drive people to do what they do because the action of people (or states) requires calculations of outcomes.

I hope that this week’s class discussion will share a light on this week’s readings. I especially got confused reading the text by Laffey and Weldes. After reading it several times I still do not really know what the symbolic technologies are and why it is recommended to use symbolic technologies in explaining that ideas play a role in foreign policy making.

References

Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Chance. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Accessed September 18, 2016. https://americanuniversity.ares.atlas-sys.com/ares/ares.dll?Action=10&Type=10&Value=98488

Laffey, Mark and Jutta Weldes. 1997. “Beyond Beliefs: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the Study of International Relations.” European Journal of International Relations 3, no. 2: 193-237. Accessed September 16, 2016. https://americanuniversity.ares.atlas-sys.com/ares/ares.dll?SessionID=C213645761J&Action=10&Type=10&Value=98492

Weber, Max. 1920. The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. London: Fitzroy Dearborn Publishers. Accessed September 16, 2016. https://s3.amazonaws.com/static.ironline.american.edu/Jackson+International+Relations/Readings/Weber+-+Prefatory+Remarks.pdf