Afghanistan and a Monopoly of Violence

I think about public authority and how a monopoly on the use of violence is an important component of modern states I am reminded of my time in Afghanistan and how that is a state with just about anything but a monopoly on the use of force. Between the Resolute Support coalition, warlords, the Taliban, and regional neighbors there are hundreds of independent entities all of whom hold the ability to dispense violence with different aims across different areas. Some like the United States have the ability to use violence anywhere in the country, others, like Pakistan or most warlords, are limited to a very narrow region. This is a particularly extreme case, but it highlights a point that a non-monopolistic relationship between the state and violence does not mean the state as an institution will cease to exist.

                We can however see in this case the state’s ability to tax, govern and provide services is limited by its ability to project power. I wonder however, since Afghanistan ‘outsources’ a good bit of its security and stability work to others, does this mean that the government’s reach is further, and therefore it has even more legitimacy and utility that it otherwise would? Would then the outsourcing of violence actually lend the state more legitimacy? I don’t know if there is an answer to these questions, especially since in this case a large part of the outsourcing went to an ostensibly ‘neutral’ coalition with very little to gain and a lot to lose if the central government falls.